

Praxis of Existential Reality

**Body as Action and
I as the Other in the Midst of the
World in the Philosophical Labyrinth
of**

Jean-Paul Sartre

In Relation to
Martin Heidegger
And
G.W.F. Hegel

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It is legitimate to say that Jean-Paul Sartre was highly idiosyncratic and one of the most influential and controversial philosophers of the 20th century. He was widely controversial in regards to his political and ideological Marxist doctrine. On the other hand, Existential philosophy as we know it today was widely consolidated through the writings of Jean-Paul-Sartre, and a special place has his book *Being and Nothingness* which was finished during the macabre times of 1943, and since then, it has been extremely influential. I will be focusing my critical analyses revealing the pros and cons in Sartre's Existentialism and Ontological sphere. I will dismiss the Neo-refined-Marxism of Sartre, because I do believe that his existential and ontological thoughts are the most intricate, stimulating, and prevailing ones. Sartre's thoughts have such a plethora of sub-structures and philosophic-artistic rendering, which makes his thinking ambiguous and porous. The locus of my mind will project on consciousness in regards, to "being" and the "other" as a system of our experience and existence in-the-midst-of-the-world—"being-in-itself" and that of "being-for-it-self". Also, I will explore the relation of the "look", "anguish," "freedom," "body" and its "actions" in the human world.

In terms of Sartre's philosophical-political Marxist dogma and ideology, I will just say that: I reject the very root of Marxist reincarnation, resurrection or rebirth, that which Sartre wanted to legitimize; an ideology which has already been debunked for a long time. Marxist-Communist-Utopianism is useless to

argue as Lefort, Laclau, and Mouffe do even today—they still hit a dead horse. On the other hand, after the 1994 book of Martin Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy*, and the 1995 book of Francois Furet, *The Passing of an Illusion*, I think that is worthless to pay any intellectual homage to philo-Communism, that which demolished human capacity in the societies that experienced it. Both Furet and Malia showed us that the *violent cholera* and the *terroristic cyclone* of communist utopia is gone, at least it cannot be seen in the near future horizon. The main aspect that I repudiate is this: there is [not a single totality], a unifying whole or a totalizing structure in our situation of being constituted in the system of the world. There is a multiplicity, interconnectedness, and a plethora of inter-subjectivity. Therefore, the “dialectic totality” and the “absolute idealism” of Plato, Hegel, Marx, and Sartre in other degrees is not valid.

Regarding Sartre’s existential-ontological axiom, my discourse is more analytical than a rejection of all of Sartre’s philosophical spectrum. I say this because; the locus of this discourse will be Sartre and Martin Heidegger, where Emmanuel Levinas will be a complementary figure. The field of my operation is going to be precisely that of existential-ontological one. My position will be first and foremost comparative and secondly critical of Sartre and Hegel. Thus my position in some respect is a split one, although, I will lean and support Heidegger’s thought. To dissect the very condition of our existence and being in the world of “now” and “here” is a complex situation, because there are many similarities between them regarding the aspect of “being-present-now”. They all emphasize the “now-relationship-with-the-other”, rejecting the higher-lower and *cyclical* and *unchangeable* ideas or forms of Plato and Hegel (although, Sartre is more implicated with Hegel’s dialectical strategy of opposites. Sartre sees this dialectical paradigm as more parallel-going than cyclical or dialectical phenomenon). However, for Heidegger the notion of *Mitsein* (being-with) and *Dasein* (being-in-the-world) are the hard core battle ground confrontations with Sartre. Interestingly enough, Sartre diverges from Hegel; about, whether being is nothingness or being “is” and nothingness is “not”. I will elaborate more on these issues later on.

For Sartre the condition of “being-for-itself” and “being-in-self” might seem to navigate to dualism but, this is not the case in point. For Sartre both *being-in* and *being-for* are neither apart, nor dualistic—they go in parallel

pathways and are in a perpetual flight. The point that Sartre makes it that, the phenomena of “existent” is not esoteric or exoteric; but rather, there dominates the notion of parallel, and tantamount or equivalent—all refer to other phenomenon. What is of mega significance for Sartre here, it is the fact of “totality” of appearances that enables me to be. Thus with Sartre we see that the notion of consciousness resembles that of opacity, and more than that, consciousness is not to be known. It does not have the structure of knowledge—consciousness is free in its own zone of negation and nothingness. On the other hand, Hegel in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* elucidates that consciousness is aware and ‘knows something’—it is the *in-itself*.

Sartre in relation to Hegel, and Descartes—Sartre in relation to Heidegger, Deleuze & Guattari

It seems that there exists a dualistic Cartesian principle in Sartre’s thinking; however, it is this very notion that Sartre wants not to delineate. Although, Sartre believes that every philosophical inquiry regarding human reality ought to begin with “cogito”. On the other hand, Heidegger will not begin with *cogito*—he will provide us with the notion of ontico-ontological aspect of *Dasein*—being-in-the-world; that which Sartre rejects. Sartre’s *being* does not present monism either. So then, what is really vindicated in this “parallel symbiosis” of being for-itself and being in-itself, if Sartre’s definition of consciousness is neither exterior nor interior; although, it navigates in the interior sphere of mind? Where is the point of difference of Sartre from that of Hegel, and then from Heidegger? How Sartre perceives the Cartesian notion of *cogito*?

I am putting forward the principle that Hegel is the end of Plato and of all Platonism in Western civilization, as much as Hegel is the starting point of Sartre. With Hegel we have the end terminal consciousness of being—precisely because; we have the monist-absolute unity of the subject-object notion of being-in-itself, and being-for-itself in its absoluteness operating in the realm of external negation. As in Plato, Hegel perceives progress as cyclical and self-same. It

returns and re-produces itself within itself that of which being was, is, and will become. In Hegelian terms, freedom is *eidetic* or just the notion of the idea. In other words, for Plato and Hegel there is the start and the finish line of cyclical selfsame or spirit (*Geist*) and being—it is the sublime being the uttermost or transcendent event of logos (reason) as the emerging spirit. Hegel's absoluteness is aiming to finish the end cycle of spirit. The attainment of "truth" for Hegel is determinant by "being-in-itself" (*Sein*). The *being* of the being-in-itself as the only *truth* for Hegel is situated above everything else (same of Plato). In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel states: "But we distinguish this being-for-another from *being-in-itself*; whatever is related to knowledge or knowing is also distinguished from it, and posited as existing outside of this relationship; this *being-in-itself* is called *truth*" (53). Furthermore, Hegel would say that: "Thus in what consciousness affirms from within itself as being-in-itself or the True we have the standard which consciousness itself sets up by which to measure what it knows... Consciousness knows *something*; this object is the essence or the *in-itself*..." (53, 55) Hegel emphasizes the notion that, consciousness is aware of its knowledge and it-self knowing what it knows about the essence of it-self. This leads us to say that, when consciousness attains the evanescence of its essence or in-itself, it will reflect the absoluteness of consciousness-knowing-it-self, objectifying the knowing of what consciousness knows. Hegel concludes saying that: "...consciousness now has two objects: one is the first *in-itself*, the second is the being-for-consciousness of this in-itself" (55). Hegel is saying that consciousness is projecting the structure of knowledge of *in-itself*, which for Hegel is the first object, that which transforms itself to be its first original itself, altering it-self to be-for-consciousness only. What is happening in the first mode of consciousness is its own *negation*, transforming *it-self* to be-for-consciousness of this mode of in-itself. And as for Hegel, this is the moment of *True*, impregnated within the womb of being-in-itself (*Sein*). Thus being for Hegel is negative and negates itself—being is an empty idea. And here we see the schism between Sartre and Hegel, because Sartre rejects the notion that being is empty-negative. Sartre sees *being-in-itself* as totally positive.

The question is this: Where Sartre stands in relation to Hegel? What consciousness constitutes for Sartre? Sartre, in *Being and Nothingness* would disagree with Hegel saying that: "Consciousness is not a mode of a particular

knowledge, which may be called an inner meaning or self-knowledge; it is the dimension of transphenomenal being in the subject" (10). The break of Sartre from Hegel starts with the notion of trans-phenomenality, which means that being surpasses knowledge and being is the very source of knowledge. In other words, being is positive. The renouncement of Hegel resides in the way that Hegel apprehends the "surpassing of being", and that for Sartre is very ambiguous, because Hegel sees being as an empty abstraction and an ultimate nothingness. For Sartre, being cannot be nothingness because being is a positive concept. Sartre would state: "But what needs examination here is especially Hegel's statement that being and nothingness constitute two opposites... To oppose being to nothingness as the thesis and antithesis, as Hegel does is to suppose that they are logically contemporary" (47). It seems obvious that which Sartre repudiates at this particular point, it is that for him being could surpass itself to something else, and for Sartre this is excepted as long as being fixes itself in its own determination only—being is what is, it is a positive force, it cannot be annihilated or negated by something exterior to it.

Furthermore, Sartre says that: "This permits Hegel to make being pass into nothingness; this is what by implication has introduced negation into his very definition of being" (47). In the same vein Sartre quotes Hegel saying: "It is pure indetermination and emptiness. *Nothing* can be apprehended in it... Hegel writes being and nothingness are empty abstractions, and the one is as empty as the other." (47) It is precisely here, that we can perceive the position that Sartre's thinking is not in accordance or it does not comply with that of Hegel. Sartre asserts that negation is not capable to nullify the seed or the spark of 'being of the Being'. For Sartre the purity of the positivity of 'being' is impervious to negation and that 'being' is in an utter bounteousness. On the other hand, Sartre elucidates that non-being is negated within being, while being remains Being as it is, because being determines its own existence. Repudiating Hegel, Sartre congeals or solidifies his position by vindicating that, Hegel was not aware of the notion that, to be empty, it is to be empty of something, to be originated from somewhere and somehow. What is empty here, it is non-being itself, because, non-being is empty of being. So then, we say that what Sartre is asserting here, it is that 'being *is* and non-being is *not*'. Thus principally, non-being resides or subsists through the progression, positivity, and life of the evanescence or

physiognomy of being. Or we could also say that, non-being is a *parasite* in the body of being.

Even though, Sartre's philosophical structure has been widely influenced by the dialectical thinking of Hegel, Sartre is able to reject Hegel's main hypothesis regarding the notion of *being*, especially when Hegel claims: "Pure absolute Being is only in pure thought, or rather it is pure thought itself... and is only Being in a negative sense. ... It is just [mere] *being*, the negative of self-consciousness" (351). For Hegel this negativity of being is eidetic or a simple idea. It negates itself externally having no spark or essence of life in it. Hegel indicates that this "being-in-itself" is in no way an abiding or persistent "being" concluding to be solidified or coagulate to something. According to Hegel's comprehension of being, it seems that this being has no inner/esoteric foundation, it does have an intrinsic quality—it is for-an-other as Hegel would say, and this an-other-being is the one that will be able to immerse or consume it.

Sartre is right opposing Hegel's view, because Sartre considers it as not normal that being-in-itself can degenerate into the being-for-itself, loosing or evaporating and obliterating the very self or essence. Being-in-itself cannot undertake a suicidal attempt, because it is not in its nature—being is positive. The point is that, Hegel following on the footsteps of Kant and what Kant emphasizes is the notion of external negation; while, Sartre aims at the notion of internal negation regarding the aspect of being and non-being. Sartre hits the point against Hegel saying: "Being-in-itself can found its nothingness but not its being. In its decompression it nihilates itself in a for-itself which becomes qua for-itself its own foundation; but the contingency which the for-itself has derived from the in-itself remains out of reach" (133). Sartre is been very explicit and rigorous about the positivity and life-giving, or process-formation of being-in-itself passing its code to for-itself. The self of being is an evanescent element resulting from this state of relief or pressure, as Sartre would say the "decompression", returning to the previous normal mode or situation; this transformative process leaves the being-in-itself solid in its attunement and positivity, as to simply be or exist in its own zone of determination and identity. In other words, it is this passing code of the in-self into the direction of for-itself as a given fact; and precisely here, we have this event that being-for-itself is impregnated with the contingency of the being-in-itself, and that would be it. According to Sartre, the

totality of consciousness is responsible for its being as well as saying that consciousness cannot stop itself from the activity of facticity of this very being. Therefore, we could say that this form of Being we are talking about, is nothing else then the reality of human beings and their factual existence and their existential fullness. I did elaborate long enough with Hegel, because I see it necessary and very important to comprehend the significance of Hegel's philosophy and its impact on Sartre; as also, to grasp the moment of Sartre's rejection of Hegel's state of consciousness and being. At this point, my existential-ontological argument is going to move along with that of Heidegger, and later a bit with that of Levinas.

The fact of the matter is that, Heidegger's philosophy has had an impact on Sartre. Sartre diverges from Heidegger as much as he did from Hegel, finding his own idiosyncratic platform. We have seen that with Hegel, where Sartre refuted his ontological aspects of consciousness and the situation of being and non-being. With Heidegger there is a double refutation, there is a rejection on ontological level and also, on the existential level. Because both Heidegger and Sartre explore the status of being on both of these realms simultaneously—the results are as such that, they have more in common with one another (although, Sartre remains still closer to Hegel's dialectical process than Heidegger does). Sartre is aware that Heidegger rejected Hegel regarding the problematic situation of being and non-being in its very core, and so did Sartre in regards to Hegel. Speaking of Heidegger, we can observe the catapult or the diametrical position of Heidegger with regards to Hegel, because Heidegger does not perceive the problem of being as negative—for him non-being *is not* and being *is*.

Heidegger situates being in "Dasein", being-in-the-world; that which is a correlation of different realities. Thus in Heidegger's thinking we see that the form and the condition of human reality are grounded in our being-in and being-with-alongside and within the world. Another important point that Heidegger makes is that, negation springs from nothingness (and this applies to Sartre too), because if nothingness causes negation that is because nothingness is negative—it is not or it is void. We see that Sartre, in this regard is concerned with the Heideggerian principle of nothingness. Can Dasein's surpassing towards itself, as a *being qua being* and also, surpass beyond the world in its very necessity of being-in-the-world? Sartre is not satisfied with Heidegger's *Dasein* and *Mitsein*

which are an impenetrable being *in* and *out* of the world, gazing at the world and participation in it, seeing the world from a distance and yet, it surpasses the world in the same manner as it captures it? For Heidegger Dasein is “existence”, realizing it-self in a variety of fluctuating and infinite possibilities. Dasein or being-in-the-world is not a *vis-à-vis* structure, but rather Dasein constitutes the world spatially. Sartre insists that the correlation of being and non-being can exist on the level of esoteric realm only. He says that: “It is within being qua being that non-being must arise...” (171). In this statement we can conclude that Sartre has turned the heavy and dusty page of Kant and Hegel—both valorizing the external aspect of being; which Sartre insists that it is only through being that non-being can arise and that is an internal process.

The notion of *anguish* is of a great significance for Sartre—only being negates itself and that being ought to be. That leads us to say that: “The relation of man in the world, which is the *negatites* indicate, have nothing in common with the relations *a posteriori* which are brought out by empirical activity. We are no longer dealing with those relations of *instrumentality* by which, according to Heidegger, objects in the world disclose themselves to “human reality” (59). Sartre is saying that reality is revealed through the gaze of man as that unit that things and sequences pass by. In other words, Sartre implies that man is the epicenter of being that the physiognomy of nothingness unveils itself in the world. He believes that; “Being can generate only being and if man is inclosed in this process of generation, only being will come out of him....—he must be able to hold it up to view as a totality” (59). Sartre seems to make a great point here, emphasizing that man is in a constant flight grasping his reality; however, only by attribute of this *totality*, which man ought to sustain, can he exist in and out of this vortex of being in the midst of the world. He asks the right question when he proclaims that “What is human freedom if through it nothingness comes into the world”?

What is freedom for Sartre? How is it attained? How is it that freedom is a necessity for the existence of human reality, et cetera? It seems that *anguish* is a key element, that which factors freedom as the being of consciousness. According to Sartre, only through the validation of *anguish* as the essence or the factual state of consciousness of being will we discover freedom. Sartre states: “Anguish is precisely my consciousness of being my own future, in the mode of

not-being. To be exact, the nihilation of horror as a *motive*, which has the effect of reinforcing horror as a state, has as its positive counterpart the appearance of other forms of conduct...as *my possible possibilities*." (68). Sartre creates or pre-projects a situation of *my-self* that which is not yet, but that which to a certain degree defines my being. This is the self that which I will become in the attribute and porous vigilance of not yet there—it is the possibility of any given choices of my actions or praxis, that which it will take me there, where I am not yet my possibility. In other words, we could say that this is the metamorphosis of anguish as the possibility of a given future, and that it has to be determent by the now-presence of my praxis. What Sartre is aiming at is that: "...we act before positing our possibilities and that these possibilities which are disclosed as realized or in process of being realized refer to meanings which necessitate special acts in order to be put into question" (75). He is trying to show us the *ruptures* and that our action is ahead of us in relation to the meaning of our wished possibilities. Only by having done the Act can we realize the possibilities of our future—future is unveiled to us through the sequences of being-in-the-act-in-the-world. Thus this future of my diverse and possible possibilities ventures in living in the horror of anguish, that which is unknown to me, in terms of how my future will be revealed to me. Sartre views anguish as my freedom and as self-objectification—the possibility of perpetual change in every instance of my being leading to continues *ruptures* and *drifts* of my-being.

The difference with Heidegger is that, for him fear and anguish is finitude or [*Thanatos*]; and for Sartre, fear and anguish is the possible fluidity of my [freedom] because there is no-stability of myself as an object. I am in a perpetual flight—there is no center of reference of me. Another example in regards to Sartre lies in *the* act of creating a painting where, the artist progresses through the labyrinth of unknown possibilities—of how that painting is going to look like, and what possibilities of different meanings will be disclosed. During the process of action in realizing this painting, there are constant ruptures and drifts, those which create a plurality or multiplicity of different possible possibilities, branching alternative points of departure for different meanings. This process of creation is an active world of painting playing itself in a perpetual intensity of change and breakage. Art-making is an *anguish* form of expressing the inner intensity of actions. Art-making is the prospect of negation, it is negation as the origin of

nothingness in this *void* that we operate here, that which materializes itself throughout the action of mind and body. Painter's constellations and actions emanate from the depth of nothingness which is been negated by the intensity of artist's praxis—his act brings about this perplexity of visual "other"—the 'other' can see himself through the object-I, (the artist) encountering the artist in his act of painting. Thus, art-making is an internal negation evolved in the act-of-body-mind of the artists. The painter penetrates in the unknown void of nothingness unveiling to us the being-of-the-in-itself that of which *is*. The emanation of painting comes forward from, in to out because of "there is" a being that *is*—it is positive because it springs a plethora of unknown possible possibilities. It emanates from something precisely because; there is a being of something. In other words, art is an esoteric freedom where anguish valorizes the process of body to act and decide perpetually in its *aporia* or perplexity. *Anguish* is an internal negation; it is the necessary energy to create my unknown possible possibilities.

Another issue that, what Sartre invested on his ontological investigation is the notion of the "other (s)", his "existence" in regards to the aspect of the "look". Sartre rejects "solipsism" as something inadequate to resolve the problem of the "other" in relation to "I-object". I will problematize the polemicizing attitude of Sartre refuting Heidegger on this matter. For Sartre is apropos or pertinent to elucidate that there is one true [*Aletheia*] vindicating that, "Human-reality remains *alone* because the Other's existence has the nature of a contingent and irreducible fact. We encounter the Other; we do not constitute him" (336). Sartre refutes in the most vigilant and desperate manner the path that Heidegger has taken, for he is convinced that Heidegger has surreptitiously build the condition of being-in-the-world in *Sein und Zeit (Being and Time)*, on the premises of solipsism and nihilism—of finitude. I will call it an ontological episode. I will insinuate and coagulate my belief that Heidegger is right. What Sartre wants to nullify is the notion that we do not constitute the Other; but rather, we encounter the Other in face-to-face or look to-look, and there, it seems that Sartre emphasizes the aspect of [being-alone-as-separate], without being-with-others-in-the-world and alongside-among-others-within-the-world. The belief of Sartre is that human existence is propelled by the intensity of inadvertent or odd prospect; such as, I am not able to be my foundation, unless the *other* is the

encounter of my-being and self. My being is encapsulated as a thing or as an object that is engaged in an accidental responsibility because the other is watching me—his look—the gaze.

As I mentioned a bit earlier about Sartre that ; even though, he made an immense leap towards the apprehension of being as something, fluid, conjectural, contingent, and temporal, he still is enmeshed in the web of Hegel's idealized absolutism and monism. Paradoxically enough, Sartre repudiates the exteriority of consciousness in regards to Hegel, and yet; he remains loyal to Hegel by supporting the totality of the other. Here is where Heidegger rightly diverges from both Hegel and Sartre. Sartre states: "If we attempt to somehow regarding the Other what Descartes attempted somehow to do for God with that extraordinary "proof by the idea of perception" which is wholly animated by the intuition of transcendence, then for our apprehension of the Other qua Other we are compelled to reject a certain type of negation which we have called an external negation...it will be an internal negation which means a synthetic, active connection of the two terms, each one of which constitutes itself by denying that it is the other...This means that the multiplicity of "Others" will not be a *collection* but a *totality* (in this case Hegel is right) since each Other finds his being in the Other." (339) It is a very veritable and yet contradictory ambition of Sartre borrowing from Hegel and Heidegger creating a hybrid and synthetic sort of structure. At this point of our discourse Sartre is extremely transparent in terms of the Other. His main aim is to put forward the principle that, not only the Other is or exists; but also, the Other does not constitute me or the Other is not me as the being of my being; and yet, I perceive myself through the look of the Other. *I* and the *Other* are beings in two different points of reference and departure in regard to consciousness, we ought to reject that the I-consciousness is the Other. And yet, they both are functioning in an internal negation. Also, the *cogito* of Descartes and that of Sartre diverges too. Sartre claims: "...Descartes has not proved his existence. Actually I have always known that I existed, I have never ceased to practice the cogito." (338) The cogito of Descartes is a façade because according to Sartre, if the situation of the other is not in front of me as in Now, and if the other's existence is not given to me in my presence and my factuality, then there is pure void and there is pointless to aim the other.

In other words, only through the understanding and the confirmation of my presence in here and now, is that which verifies my being, through me the other exists and so do I; however, we are not the same. I am the point of departure and disclosure, and that we could not perceive the other in a fictitious manner. Thus I am the tangible prove of the Other's existence and being seen by me, as I am the existence of myself seen by the look of the Other. Here I think, we have just landed to the existential structure of reciprocally. *Look* is an essential part of Sartre, as it pertains to the understanding of the Other. Sartre claims that the "For-itself" (or as Heidegger would name it *Dasein, being in the world*), is the facticity of my being, of which I am aware of, because my being is encountered or seen by the other—the other is my transcendence. It is important not to forget that we are operating in the realm of internal negation and not that of external negation as Hegel does.

At this point, *look* is so vital in being related to the other and this is precisely because, the other's look is projected at me as an object. That is what Sartre means when he says, "Being-seen-by-the-Other is the *truth* of seeing-the-Other...I see *myself* because *somebody* sees me...." (345, 349) The concept of reciprocity is important so that, my factual being is activated by the look or gaze of the other. In other words, I am becoming a look (here, look is not an actual object per say, or better yet, the eye is or it can be an actual object in this case), that sees myself and in order for me to see myself, I need to distance or be the nothingness of myself or alienate myself. The great example of Sartre in this regard, is the case when 'I have glued my ear to the door and look through a keyhole'. This instance unravels that situation I am in. It is a situation of my nothingness because, I see and I am being seen. Here we have a trio or three way-perceptions or look. I am the one that is not aware of my body in the act that I am looking at, but when I hear the sudden footsteps of another person, I become aware of myself as an object, because of the *reflective* and not of the *unreflective consciousness* as before when I was looking at the other. So what the other constitutes for me is the notion of *space* (for Sartre space is not grasped proximally and spatially, but presented as confronting the other's look), and Sartre asserts the idea that we are dealing within the ontological *totality* of world-space concept. I am being looked at as an object and I look at the other as an object simultaneously—the presence of the other person complements or

completes me as an object and, it is here where Sartre has an Hegelian approach of the Other, as being perceived as the subject in its *totality*—me and the other exist as separate and yet, we function within the *totality* of the world. In other words, the world is the domain of my possible possibilities, and the interference of the other is the limit of my possibilities. In Sartre's view the other is the death of possible possibilities as I am also, the death for the other's possibilities in the world. That leads us to the point that, it is only through my "objectification" that I can realize the presence of the other. That being said, [*freedom*] is that which Sartre has in his mind since the beginning of the book, and in the end, he arrives to the point of his desire. However, what is interesting here and it is apropos to say, is that, I am situated in the midst of the world as fleeing it, and yet, I am related to the Other (s) as not being the Other (s) only in so far as I am free. My freedom is the very structural and vital condition to be in the world with the others.

The question I will put forward is about my facticity and actuality as being in the midst of the world. How am I related to the world? How do I manifest myself and my objectivity? Is it through "my body" and the "body of the other"? Is it possible to manifest myself without the presence and facticity of my self-object or body? It is imperative to grasp the idea that we do exist, live, experience, and penetrate in the midst of the world throughout the actuality or phenomenon and the authentication or the confirmation of our very objectivity. The preconditions that Sartre gives us in regards to the understanding of the body as "being-for-itself" and "being-for-others" as we relate in the midst of the world, it is such as that, these two realities of my body for-itself and for-the-others operate in two different realms of action. That means that they cannot be abate or diminish to one unity—they have different purposes and functions. Also, another point is that body is the totality of what "there is", and everything more than that is simply null. In other words, as Sartre would say, 'there is nothing *behind* the body.' Then, *life* is earthly-human.

The first proceeding path will be that of the "body-as-being-for-itself" in its facticity in the midst of the world. Secondly, I will analyze the understanding of the "body-as-being-for-the-other". According to Sartre, the facticity of my body in its simplest and most primordial understanding is my Action or Praxis, as that which enables me to be in the world. The question is this: how come that I ought

to be as an object-to-be-present, and yet I am accidental or inadvertent as I am—there seems to be the aspect that, I am not the foundation of my very existence. What is indubitable, is the vindication of Sartre regarding the not at all infinitesimal notion that; “The body is nothing other than the for-itself...But it is the fact that the for-itself is not its own foundation, and this fact is expressed by the necessity of existing as an engaged, contingent being among other contingent beings” (408). We see that my body needs another point of reference for it to be, and this temporal-ecstatic fleeing being is not stable or centered in a particular place; but rather, my existence is surpassed by my evasion or flight directed to the negation of myself. I am an accidental being and there is no certainty of my-being too. In Sartre my-body-for-itself is the physical object that constantly encounters others in the midst of the world-look. On the other hand, Heidegger’s *Dasein*, my-being-in-the-world constitutes my existence as being-with and alongside-among others as “they” [man]. The notion of “they” in Heidegger, it is that which Sartre repudiates, because for Sartre the “they” has no particular look over my-body—it does not encounter me but, it constitutes me in the realm of *solipsism*. In other words, Sartre’s aim is that my body appears in the world as an object and that, this “I-Thing-Object-as-Flux”, emerges and materializes in the flux of the world and yet, it is this very I-Object that is the world—I represent the world being looked from the other and gazing at the other. Sartre’s circumspective or prudent assertion is that, being in the midst of the world; that is a necessity for my body to lose myself—for the materialization of the world to exist; it could be attained through my negation leading me to any possible possibilities of becoming in the world.

However, the aspect that I do disagree with and diverge from Sartre, is the fact that he believes my upsurge or the “for-itself” emerges and materializes in the world—in its *totality*. Opposing Sartre, I will adopt the position that, the “for-itself” or “my-being” appears in the midst of the world in an inter-subjective, multiple, and inter-connected body as Deleuze & Guattari coined it: the *rhizome*. I am introducing *Anti-Oedipus* of Deleuze & Guattari for a very specific reason. In relation to Sartre; however, speaking ontologically and existentially I believe that, Deleuze & Guattari have a more ontologically and existentially-pragmatic and solid case than that of Sartre in regards to the *totality* of being—for itself. In opposition to Sartre, Deleuze & Guattari see existence and being as a *desire* and

a *rhizome*, as interconnected, fragmented, and multiple in a perpetual flux. There is no particular center; but rather, there is a “horizontal” appearance of being, where totality or unity is inexistent as Hegel and Sartre would have it. In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze & Guattari state: “Hence everything is production: *production of productions*, of actions and passions; *productions of recording processes*...of sensual pleasures, of anxieties, and pain” (4). Here, the notion of pain, anxiety, passions, and most importantly of actions, is all to be located in the principle of [*desire*]. It is desire that which produces the energy of action—for Sartre, action is of mega significance—if there is no action there is no possible possibility to encounter the Other. Thus there is no human possibility. The conspicuous difference is that unlike Sartre, Deleuze & Guattari assert that; desire, like the notion of *power* for Michael Foucault, is fundamentally positive and productive in nature, thus searching always for new interconnections and instantiations. It is this *schizophrenia of desire* that which is a dynamic machine as the driving force of life itself—it produces in discontinuous fluxes and break-flows and ruptures. Fluxes are the only objectivity of desire. My body is in flux with others and not one or two or a given number within their totality of the look.

Seeing through Sartre’s eye-mind, I would like to add that, my body as an immediate actuality is all there is, and I am alienated from it when I engage with the other in the flux of the world. The second aspect of the Body is the “body-for-the-others”. What has to be pin pointed here, it is the fact that Sartre does not deviate from his internal negation of self, being, and consciousness. It is not just that, being in the world of “being-for-itself” and “for-others” to engage and encounter one another, but this connection is materialized only through the prospect of “internal negation”, and the external relation is a given need for the encounter to take place. The “body-for-others” is the necessary mechanism or agency. Sartre congeals his thought by elucidating that; “the Other, appears to me as a transcendence-transcended. That is, by the mere fact that I project myself toward my possibilities...The Other’s body is therefore the Other himself as a transcendence-instrument” (446-7). Sartre is claiming that the other’s body is the very mechanism that I can capture my self-object or selfness transcending the selfness of the other. The other is my object mirror, that which enables my objectification and selfness to materialize as a transcendence surpassing towards my possible possibilities. Thus the body of the other is the instrument through

which I can transcend my selfness. What is of mega significance here, it is the “gaze” or “look” as the most pertinent element of this engagement. Because through the relation of gaze or look I am enabled to experience my “being-an-object” that which, Sartre believes is ‘my transcendence as transcended’. This is something that I do not know and is absolutely unknown to me as far as I am not engaged in the midst of the world—I apprehend myself-as-object because I am perpetually fleeing towards the other which, consequently makes me realize my being as responsible for its existence.

The final analysis related to Sartre is that of Freedom. According to him action or praxis posits freedom and this action ought to be *'intentional'*. Before I move further, I would like to emphasize the fact that Sartre does not support the idea that, in order for the act to take place it must be deterministic in spirit. That being said, in regards to the subject matter Sartre states: “Human-reality is free because it is *not enough*. It is free because it is perpetually wrenched away from itself and because it has been separated by a nothingness from what it is and from what it will be...Freedom is precisely the nothingness which is *made-to-be* at the heart of man and which forces human-reality *to make itself* instead of *to be*” (568). To begin with, for Sartre the human-reality is not determined. Human reality is produced by the choice of Actions/Praxis. It is the act of free will as the force that is needed for my existence to be. To love, one is required to love the act of love. Thus to act one is motivated from the emanation of will—to be able to will I should realize my act or praxis. The world is to be changed. Freedom is an empty phenomenon unless I act to probe the nothingness of freedom as appearance. Human-reality is materialized by human action. Sartre elucidates that: “Action, in fact is to be considered simultaneously on the plane of the “for-itself” and on that of the in-self...” (795). It is this parallel will of action as that of which is the essence and the source of existence and being. Without action there is no engagement with the other. Action is the quake of life itself. Life is a *will* such as having *the will* to act and to experience your acts in the manner of being there—being present.

Heidegger in relation to Sartre, Hegel, and Levinas

So far I have investigated Sartre's notions of consciousness, anguish, body, act/praxis, being-*for*-itself and that of being-*in*-itself, all leading to the conclusion of Sartre: "freedom." I also shown the semi-divergence of Sartre from Hegel, and that being so, because, Sartre rejected the exoteric/external negation of Hegel; however, maintained the *totality principle* of Hegel. Thus Sartre is a synthetic formation, while Heidegger differentiates himself from Hegel in all the possible ontological and existential forms. In other words, Heidegger repudiates Hegel in all accounts. The demarcation of Heidegger from Hegel, (Sartre is on the same platform with Heidegger repudiating Hegel in the aspect of time and now-presence, past and future) is precisely claimed in the end of *Being and Time*, when Heidegger states: "True to tradition, Hegel's analysis of time has its locus in the second part of his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences... to the discussion of 'space and time'...He calls these 'the abstract "outside-of-one-another'... Space "is" time; that is, time is the truth according to Hegel this Being of space unveils itself as time...space is rather, as Hegel says, 'punctuality' ["Punktualitat"]....But by such a representation, space does not get grasped in its Being" (481-2). Heidegger has a diametrically different position from that of Hegel and Heidegger's demarcation is clear—he does not see *time* and *being* as *selfsame*. Heidegger does not see time as the negative "oneness" or as the *monist* condition of being in regards to the *being-outside-of-itself*. For Heidegger this is the idealization of time in its most abstract way. Hegel's notion of time as that which is 'outside-of-one-another', leads to the negation of *within-itself*. In other words, being and nothingness are seen as empty abstractions. According to Hegel, *space* and *time* are determined by negativity and nothingness, and that being-outside-of-itself in its indifference, is nothing more than the negation of the negation of "time", of *selfsame*.

Heidegger proceeds much further in regards to Hegel's Plato-nostalgia. Heidegger rightly sees that Hegel perceives time as the *now*. The *past* and *future*

are non-existence. Hegel focuses on the principle of eternity and of the "present." Furthermore, Heidegger elaborates Hegel's statements about *time* and *being*. "The "now" is monstrously privileged...Thus in a positive sense one can say of time that only the Present is; "before" and "after" are not...Time is the pure Self-*external*, intuited, *not grasped* by the self...by its very essence spirit necessary appears in time..." (485). What is to be pin pointed here, it is the fact that Hegel stands for the abstract negativity of time, and where, the present is what matters the most because, the past and future are not within the orbit of time. We see that the element of spirit in its absoluteness surpasses the temporality of time. Hegel as Plato before him believed that time, space and spirit dwell in the realm of *selfsameness*—a time that repeats endlessly and returns back to the same point of beginning or departure—it is the [*cyclic* time.]

If for Plato, the selfsameness of time is regulated by *numbers*, going back to the same beginning of the cosmic bodies, for Hegel, time is penetrated by the endlessness of *spirit* that which negates time itself. For Hegel the absoluteness of knowledgeable spirit is that which is the only truth. Thus Hegel sees time in a cyclical movement where progress is perceived within the circle of historical events. However, where the difference between Heidegger and Hegel lies; it is that for Heidegger, spirit is not that which falls into time. Heidegger is very precise stating that spirit first and foremost *Exists*. He argues that: "Spirit does not fall *into* time; but factual existence 'falls' as falling from primordial, authentic temporality" (486). Heidegger advocates the evanescence of temporality and that the actual existence after all, falls into *finitude*. I have put Hegel in the middle of Sartre's and Heidegger's existential-ontological vortex-swirl precisely; because, it discloses or it conveys to us the undeniable fact that: Sartre and Heidegger have more in common with one another *than* diverging from one another. They approach human presence ontologically nuanced with variations of colorful pathways; however, at the end, they both arrive at the same point of their initial departure. Their demarcation from Platonism is remarkably clear, and their divergences from Hegel on the issues we have discussed in this discourse are radical, and obvious. Now, I believe that time is ripe to argue about Sartre' and Heidegger's deeper differences. As I have said earlier, this essay is first and foremost a critical-analytic discourse and then, it is a analytical-comparative one,

leaning to the argument that ontologically and existentially Heidegger is the one that I stand for.

I started from the end of Heidegger's *Being and Time*, because I wanted to show the relatedness of Sartre and Heidegger, and most importantly their divergence from traditional philosophy. Now I will start from the beginning. The same question that Sartre posits is the same one that Heidegger starts his onto-ontological and existential-ontological investigations with the most simple and yet, the most significant question: *What is being?* Heidegger (and Sartre as well) does not believe that the factuality of being and its existence is cyclic or circle, as Plato and Hegel would have us to believe. I do agree with both Heidegger and Sartre emphasizing the notion that *being is* and that—it is a positive being. Heidegger argues that: "Being lies in the fact that something is, and in its Being as it is; in Reality; in presence-at-hand; in subsistence; in validity; in Dasein; in the 'there is'" (26). For Heidegger being is an existence or an actuality of being-in-the-world, in the reality that we comprehend it as being-with-others, and encountering the others as we relate with them-*they*. For Heidegger, the ontological aspect of being from Plato until late 19th century (excluding, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Husserl), has been wrongly grasped. Heidegger approaches being in the mode of onto-ontological inquiry. Ontic because what *there is*. Thus Heidegger sees the aspect of being in its existential form and thus, he is analyzing it through the domain of *ontical* prism. Being-in-the-world is something as a given for Dasein to be and to exist, so then: "Dasein exists...is an entity which in each case I myself am...Being-in, is a state of Dasein's Being, it is an existiale" (78-9). The being "in" is important because for Heidegger the notion of "in" describes the fact that others are related to this world like I am related present-at-hand, within the sphere of "they-I" engagement. Dasein is mine and I am that Dasein which Heidegger says is 'mineness'. That being said, Dasein in every instance and sequence of my-being-in and my-being-with is my very existence. It is my possible possibilities being dispersed in the condition of "being-in-the-world" as my actuality, the one that arises in Dasein's existential spatiality. Thus, there is involved the very possibility of my diversity or plurality of being, engaged in a plethora of ways in the human world and time too.

The question that I would like to put forward is this: how does Dasein progresses or drives itself in the world? How it infiltrates and penetrates into the

Reality of being there with the "they" or "them"? Heidegger makes an explicit and remarkable argument saying that: "When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of some inner sphere, in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of Being is such that, it is always 'outside' alongside entities which it encounters and which belongs to a world already discovered. Nor is any inner sphere abandoned when Dasein dwells alongside the entity to be known, and even then; "Being-outside' the object, Dasein is still 'inside'...as a Being-in-the-world" (89). Heidegger is very specific about the nature of Dasein—Dasein is always a "being" which is engaged in-the-world, and even when it is out or alongside the encountered object. According to Heidegger, Dasein as Being-in-the-world is to be apprehended and grasped beforehand, as something that arises in its spatiality—in the realm of that which it knows. Dasein is in *me* or I am *it* that interconnects and bridges or modifies my being in relation with the other, disclosing my being and throwing myself towards the other possible possibilities. And because "being-in-the-world", is apprehended as a phenomenon like *ahead* or *primordial* then, in Heidegger's view, we are *thrown* in the world of Dasein—already being discovered by Dasein in its very existence *in* the world. Thus Dasein is ahead of it-self in the web of the multiple possibilities and interconnections and transformations. The world is prior to Dasein's engagement. The world is.

Another interrogation with respect to Dasein as being-in-the-world is the "world-hood" of the world which *is*. How is it related to the spatiality of "being-in-the-world? What is the space that Dasein occupies? Is Dasein's proximal nature in terms of being-present-at-hand and that of being-ready-to-hand located in a particular or distinguishable place, which it can be congealed? As I have already commented, Dasein is "in" the world. From this fact we ought to proceed. Also, another Heideggerian emphasis is the actuality and facticity of Dasein, and that means that Dasein is engaged with a plethora of beings and objects in the world when it throws itself in. What is becoming obvious, there is the notion that Dasein *brings things forward "closer" to me or us* because it *constitutes* these different unities—Dasein is familiar with what encounters in the world. Inquiring a bit more about this particular spatiality of Dasein as it is engaged in the world, Heidegger makes an explicit point saying that: "But its spatiality shows the character of *de-severance* and *directionality*...We use the expression

"de-severance"* in a signification which is both active and transitive... "De-severing"* amounts to making the farness vanish—that is, making the remoteness of something disappear, bringing it close" (138-9). Furthermore, to make his point more solid, he adds that: *"In Dasein there lies an essential tendency towards closeness...The circumspective de-severing of Dasein's everydayness reveals the Being-in-itself of the 'true world'—of that entity which Dasein, as something existing, is already alongside"* (140-1). This "closeness" that Heidegger speaks of, is very important because, it provides us with this apropos factuality of the authenticity or originality or truthfulness of Dasein in being-engaged-in-the-possibility-of-the-world. It is possibility at hand and present in this sequence of encounter. It shows the real physiognomy or skeleton, and the structure of Dasein in its everydayness and the way it is transformed in its environment. The de-severance and bidding or directionality that Dasein forwards is "real" and it is not concerned with subjective structures of reality; rather, Dasein is that being-in-itself that is true and real because, Dasein communicates or conveys itself with unities that already exist alongside. There is no sequential moment that Dasein is not. It is always a part of everydayness and environmental happenings.

What Heidegger wants to show, is that Dasein is not a unity or a body of being that is remote and distant from the space it exists. Things come closer to us because of this very energetic wave of instant being. It is significant to apprehend Dasein's field of operation in its special physiognomy and in the form of de-severance. We ought to not forget that de-severance is action and transition. That being said, this flux of activity and transit-transformation of Dasein makes it a Reality and perpetually self-engaged-beforehand-in-nature—objectifying the existence of Dasein as it is involved in the world. I am Dasein. In this regard Heidegger states: "Indeed space is still *one* of the things that is constitutive for the world, just as Dasein's own spatiality is essential to its basic state of Being-in-the-world" (148). Closing the argument of Dasein's spatiality we could say that: objects or individuals or unities are engaged in the world, it is because there is space, or I allow space to be opened up to those individuals or unities.

What is space? Can we say there is no world without space? Thus to be in the world, the nearest of space or its proximal line is revealed to us in its spatial

mode. In principle of the spatiality of space, from the factuality of Dasein as being-in-the-world, space is disclosed to us before we actually occupy it—it is processed beforehand because Dasein always is a step ahead of itself. More than that, Dasein is engaged in space in an aporia or constant perplexity, because there is the “who” that Dasein is perplexing itself with, that which is to be encountered in the midst of the world. It is the “who” that space belongs and arises and initiates itself as a possibility. If for Plato, the notion of *time, space*, and the condition of *human existence* was riddled, grasped and comprehended on the realm of the sky and the cosmic order or of higher and lower forms; and if for St. Augustine, the issue was the “what” path we follow, ending with the concept that, it is the “soul” that which things are formed and just are as they are; for Heidegger, we have the “Who” is time and space? Heidegger’s answer is Dasein—being-present-in-here-in-the-world. It is Heidegger that came up with the notion that time-space is *present-alongside-me*, so is me and my human-reality the center of action. Heidegger brings life to earth and to human reality where it really belongs—not looking for the other in the infinity of soul and sky, but rather in the [“finitude”] of human existence. Heidegger rightly says: “Yet men’s ‘*substance*’ is not spirit as a synthesis of soul and body; it is rather *existence*” (153). This view is not nihilistic; rather, it is what life and reality including human condition is. Existence is a positive condition; it has a beginning and end, where life’s evanescence and appearance is—it is finitude.

The ontological question I want to ask is this: if Dasein is absorbed in the world, then, *who* is that it is encountering with? *Who* is this indubitable structure of this environmental involvement in the everydayness of Dasein? To apprehend the veritable aspect and disclose the “who” it is apropos to say that, we ought to start with the notion that “being-in-the-world” is a necessary principle. However, how is it possible to claim that to be in the world in the structure of continues and environmental everydayness Dasein can be visible? The problem is not just the “who” but it is complimented by the “they” from where the “who” is congealed and becomes visible. It is “Being-with” and “Being-one’s-Self” that from which we can understand the existential presence of Dasein, because after all, Dasein is mine in every instance and sequence of my being. Heidegger states: “This ‘with’ is something of the character of Dasein... ‘With’ and ‘too’ are to be understood *existentially*, not categorically. By reason of this *with-like* [*mithaften*]

Being-in-the-world, the world is always the one that I share with Others. The world of Dasein is a *with-world* [*Mitwelt*]. Being-in is *Being-with* Others. Their Being-in-themselves within-the-world is *Dasein-with* [*Mit-dasein*]." (155) At this point we could say that, Heidegger has given us the existential principle of what means to be in the world, and what is *to be with*, to which extend the world as a substantial and integral element is. This is because I am engaged in the midst of the world with the other's *Dasein-with*. It is the *within* the world of human reality that I encounter the other. One is never alone as Sartre claims and never remote or aloof in the world. To say that I am in-the-world and with-the-world, it is to say that I am engaged with it environmentally in the labyrinth of life-Nature. So then it is my-being that I experience determining myself in the way I am perceived in the world. This is not to forget that I still operate in Dasein's "spatiality", at least existentially.

Heidegger puts forwards the idea that: "Yet one must not fail to notice that we use the term "Dasein-with" to designate that Being for which the Others who are [die seienden Anderen] are freed within-the-world... If Dasein-with remains existentially constitutive for Being-in-the-world, then...it must be Interpreted in terms of the phenomenon of *care*, for as "care" the Being of Dasein in general is to be defined" (156-7). Heidegger asserts two significant points. First, we have the notion that our freedom is sustained and solidified precisely because we constitute the other—the other is my freedom and, the other's freedom or liberation is attained because the other constitutes my-Dasein-with. This existential-ontological vindication is practically shaped because there is no Dasein without Dasein-with. We are related-with the others in Dasein's existential spatiality. It is Dasein's actuality and facticity that which we are engaged in. The second argument is related to the notion of "care". Heidegger's argument is that *care* or *anxiousness* or *solicitude* is the very core factor regarding the fundamental structure or the essence being. It is the attribution of *concern* which *being-with* does not include in its ecstasy and embodiment. He says that: "Concern is a character-of-Being which Being-with cannot have as its own, even though Being-with, like concern, is a *Being towards* entities encountered with-the-world" (157). It is angst the factor that Dasein embodies within-itself encountering a given number of individuals and unities, and not at all the element of concern. Then Dasein is angst— it is the anxiousness and the

uncertainty of being which encounters the others in the realm of the world. In other words, we could reframe it in the manner that, the individuals I am engaged in-the-world do not concern my-Dasein; rather, it is my anxiety that which is my perplexity [*aporia*]. Going a bit further, in regards to being-towards individuals engaged with them in the world, it is our natural space and environment already given to us that which we encounter and what concerns us here.

Furthermore, Heidegger pin points: "We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as *they* [*man*] take pleasure; we read, and judge about literature and art as *they*...The "they", which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness" (164). It is interesting to see that this *everydayness* is not reckoned, it is not volatilizing or evaporating either—it is there in its spatial format. It is in its proximal space and it is communicated to us out of our awareness and in our environment. And yet, we are a part of this group called *they*. We belong in the "they" existential-ontological sphere. What is pertinent here; it is the issue that "mineness" or of my-being-in-the-world which is interrupted by encountering the "they". As long as I am not aware of them-they (man), I am alongside with others in the everydayness of my possibilities. The being of the other could be anybody, and I am not myself because anybody could be me. We are enmeshed in the mass/group of the "they"—the "they" provides us with the outcome that we needed, and that is as Heidegger says the "who". Is Heidegger who states that: "...to the question of the "whom" of everyday Dasein, is the "nobody" to whom everyday has already surrendered itself in Being-among-one-other [Untereinandersein]" (166). Thus our encounter with the other is tantamount to the vagueness of the "they"—"they" is me and I am them. However, there is no definition to be ciphered; it is just an ecstatic temporality of my existence towards the other. The aspect of *they* has to be grasped in a spatial-existential concept.

The other issue that concerns us here in relation to Sartre is that of finitude. Where is Dasein standing at in regards to its finitude? According to Heidegger, there is the notion of guilt that Dasein embodies saying that, "...Dasein is essentially guilty. The existential way taking this 'guilt' is resoluteness, is therefore authentically accomplished...has become so transparent that Being-guilty is understood as something constant... only in so far as Dasein discloses to itself its potentiality-for-Being, and discloses it 'right to its end'" (353). In this significant

passage, we are confronted with the most difficult aspect of our existence in the world—our tangible life. The notion that there is an end to our journey is shivering and for some, even egregious or flagrant, leaving no room for utopian-spiritual possibilities and meditative-psychedelic rush.

Spiritual speculative philosophy or transcendental idealist thinking has been obliterated long ago—we are left with the bare bone or skeleton of our existence, and from here we ought to perceive our-being-in-the-world. That being said, *guilt* is asserting itself as evanescence. There is an end and this exposure to death is resolute. It is the *authentic* state of Dasein's attunement [*Befindlichkeit*] that which makes the difference—it is congealed when Dasein is thrown in the world; it is also arising and directing itself towards the end road of its death. Then we say that; death is my final liberation or freedom from the guilt of being, my existence reaches its highest pedestal or authentic status when my death occurs—in my finitude. I am not guilty engaging with the others and they are not encountered by my-Dasein either. To think of death in a theological platform is to avoid the real act and facticity of death. Thinking death theologically or religiously or speculatively is to escape the essence of what means to be alive. Life is existentially experienced among-others, we relate-to-others, and being-with others. Heidegger's view is not nihilistic, but rather real and human. To be a spiritual or religious person does not mean that you live an authentic life because you hypothetically, and with no evidence dedicate your entire life to an unknown God. On the other spectrum, Dasein as a whole is alive and continues to be, because existence *is* and, this is despite and regardless of my-own-being-in-the-world. The world in its spatial environment exists on its own terms—it is.

To compliment whatever we have accomplished, I would like to emphasize that: it is the notion of *angst* or *anxiety* of our everyday perplexities that embodies our condition of Being-guilty. This condition of "anxiousness" is concealed, and yet, it is pronounced by the actuality and truism [*Aletheia*] of death equiprimordially. Dasein's Being and its attunement is engaged in a perpetual motion of flight which is a need [*Ananke*] in its sequence of ecstatic-temporality. Its state of *horizontal* possibility and multiplicity of beings seems to be looking forward and gazing at the spectrum of death. Being-in-the-world in its very core and essence is angst. Heidegger conveys to us the notion of Dasein's *finitude* saying that: "In this concernful fleeing lies a fleeing *in the face of death*—

that is, a looking-away *from* the end of Being-in-the-world...Being-*towards* the end which ecstatically *futural*...The "they" never dies...for death is in each case mine" (477). I think that the greatest schema [*noema*] is not the dreamlike [*oneiric*] condition of our state-of-being, or the notion of our intellectual mind [*noetic* capacity], in order for us to apprehend what is at stake in regards to death. Rather, there is the human existential condition and actuality which enables us to come to terms and understand our finitude. To try to evade death is like to try not to be born in this life. Neither one is in our possible power to change the end result. Finitude is "now-future", because every "now" is progressing forwards and towards the spectrum of death. However, this undeniable and assertive fact of *finitude* does not apply to the "they" as a group—as a proximal point of reference which manifests itself in evanescence and abstract physiognomy. It is the opacity or in away this obscure fact of human time that passes by in our eyes, and because we cannot stop it or grasped it, that is why it concerns us the most. It is a concern precisely because; we are fleeing "en route" with the *now-time-passing* facing with angst the moment of our finitude, that which we try to evade but unable not to look at. It is there. Only by facing our finitude will we be able to live the now, the now-past, and the now-future that is fleeing us constantly.

Before reentering Sartre's thinking, I will engage a bit Levinas in regards to Heidegger's notion of death. In *Time and the Other*, Levinas makes quite a different case. For Levinas, death is not that which brings human freedom; rather, it is the notion of *suffering* that he emphasizes. Levinas states: "In pain, sorrow, and suffering, we once again find, in a state of purity, the finality that constitutes the tragedy of solitude...In suffering there is an absence of all refuge. It is the fact of being directly exposed to being" (68-9). It is the notion of pain and suffering that constitutes the condition of Being in its fullness and faces the reality of life. For Levinas the terminal point of our freedom as we exist is attained only through the irremissible facticity and the truism of being-in-the-world. It seems that for Levinas; "death is never now" (72). According to him, when death is present I am not able to face it in that very presence, because we are not in the state of being able to seize and apprehend it. In this case, I do oppose Levinas, and I do not find Levinas' suffering concept as the true state of being. It is not true what Levinas suggests that, through suffering one is in his purest state of existence or being.

The way that he adds hope is inadequate. There is only one fact that solicitude is evading and eroding our minds; *it is death*, precisely because it is the only one true terminal of our existence. While, suffering and pain is difficult and unbearable; however, there is the notion of unpredictable and unknown path of Hope that which pacifies and takes away our anxiety and fear. The common denominator of Being is Hope, because in it we find possibilities and ways of love and fecundity. Death [*Thanatos*] is something we in our everydayness dismiss or evade, because love [*Eros*] enables us to flee in-the-world and encounter exuberant moments of life. Heidegger is right to suggest that Dasein's Being in its vigor of possible possibilities of existence seizes life, it constitutes the others and being-with-others alongside and at-hand with the "they" [man]. Death is freedom because there is no one else, which one engages in the realm of existential human world. I think that the notion of finitude is one of the greatest points that Heidegger made in regards to being-in-the-world. Heidegger's lucidity/clarity is renounced at some level by Sartre and his understanding of Being and the Other in-the midst-of-the-world.

I have shown that in regards to the notion of consciousness Sartre and Heidegger both reject Hegel, and for the most part they are in accordance that *consciousness is an internal-process-negation*. Secondly, for Sartre *freedom* is an empty phenomena unless one acts and creates the energy of being in the world—it is not attained because of finitude, but because of action or praxis as that which enables me to be and face the possibilities—through the Others I realize my being because of other's look. Third, Sartre emphasizes that "body" is that which is physical and through its physicality encounters the world of the other. Fourth, Anguish and fear enable me to act "now" creating the possible possibilities not yet there, but I have to act. Anguish is my consciousness of being-my future. Sartre emphasizes that Freedom is what enables me to be and encounter the other as my possibility, but this needs to be processed through Action, or my worldly Praxis. Thus freedom is a necessary condition of my being-in-the-midst-of-the-world. So far I have elucidated the positions of both Heidegger and Sartre, where and how they diverge and in what degree their schism takes place. It is this question that I will end this discourse. Sartre claims that the end result of Heidegger is falling in monism or solipsism. Heidegger himself is against such thing, be it monism, empiricism, transcendental idealism,

Hegel's dialectics, or Cartesian *cogito*—for sure Heidegger does not start his ontico-ontological or existential thought from either one. He is been influenced by the specificity of the philosophical approach of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and particularly the phenomenology of Husserl.

That being said, what we see is that Sartre in opposition to Heidegger believes that the "they" and "being-with", lead us into solipsism and monism. He continues saying that: "Heidegger's being-with is not the clear and distinct position of an individual confronting another individual; it is not knowledge. It is the mute existence in common of one member of the crew...the relation of *mit- Sein* can be of absolutely no use...in resolving the psychological, concrete problem of the recognition of the Other" (332-4). It is precisely here that I reject Sartre's absolutist position having one-way street existential path. It seems to me that Heidegger's position does not lead us to monism and Solipsism, and even if it does so, it is existentially and ontologically more relevant than the one-to-one robotic body-to-body alone encounter of Sartre. Or, I face the other and the other faces me, so then, I can understand myself and the other does the same. Heidegger's ontico-ontological and existential position is solid and it is congealed because, I am *with* and being-with-at-hand and alongside-the-other allows my-Dasein to experience a plethora of unknown possibilities. This shows us that the notion of Dasein's totality or the whole of Being is not the same as that of Hegel's or Marx's and Sartre's own version and position. It is not as Sartre would say that *Human-reality is alone* because the other's being is *accidental*; we encounter the other precisely because, we do constitute him through the fact of Being-with and the "they".

Where the fallacy of Sartre is most obvious, is that he maintains an anachronistic Hegelian and Marxist position. He states, "The multiplicity of "Others" will not be a collection but a totality...since each Other finds his being in the Other" (339). Yes, it is true that we find ourselves in the engagement with the other. However, Sartre is mistaken to the point that he erases the possibility of finding himself in the "they" as his Other. The "they" constitutes the world of our possible not yet known to us possibilities. The "they" and being-with and alongside of them is that which creates the world as we know it and as it Is. It is precisely the notion of *probable probability* that I find myself among-others-as-being-constituted-by-them; and yet, I am my own-being but a being that is

intermingled and dispersed in the world of the “they” and the “others”. To be is to be with and among others in the probability of a plethora of my-possibilities. The gravest misinterpretation of Heidegger by Sartre is when Sartre claims that: “Heidegger’s human reality “exists outside itself” (336). But to be reminded, Heidegger describes this notion very carefully saying that, “...even in this ‘Being-outside’ alongside the object, Dasein is still ‘inside’, if we understand this in the correct sense; that is to say, it is itself ‘inside’ as a Being-in-the-world which knows” (89). Sartre is aware of all this, but he choose to disregard what Heidegger reality claims here. For Heidegger our being is a proximal one, it is a being in a spatial-existential horizontal line. And if we are alone, we are alone to the degree of being-with-others and the “they” [man] in a spatial principle. The truism is that Being-in-the-world is a solicitude and concern, but not in an individual level as Sartre believes the case to be. In Heidegger’s logic, even in the most extreme case of being-alone or the scenario of my existence-alone-in-the-world (which is not solipsism), I still operate within-the-world and only in it as Being-with it. Sartre did not see that for Heidegger the notion of my-being-in-the-world is fundamentally the very structure of knowing that this very human world is intertwined or interconnected in such way that Dasein is never really alone—alone only in its passivity of not encountering any other object, which is finitude. I encounter the other, the “they” [man] not only on the street or any public random place; but rather, I do engage-with any of ‘them’ in-being-environmentally-concerned-in-the-world. That is to say, it is the “nobody” that my being-in-the-world has collapsed or has capitulated in being-alongside-the-they. The “they” is to be apprehended as existential and as the physiognomy of my primordial arising in the proximal-spatiality of the world.

Dasein’s attunement or its state of mind is the very structure of “being in-there-in-the-world”. The truthfulness of Being is found in Dasein’s primordial structure. Dasein is always a step ahead of itself, not yet determined as being; is that which will be in the near possible future. Seeing from Heidegger’s prism we say that: the “there is”, it is precisely because there is Being—because Being-in-the-world just *is*, *Dasein is veritable*. The Other is an object because the presence of the other is located in its existential-spatial form. The other, if not viewed as the “they” [man] along-among-others-in-the-world, than it is not possible to be my center of gravitation in the possibilities of my existence in the world. The

world is a flux of possible multiple possibilities of my being. The tangible other, whether in *cares* or *desire* cannot presuppose me as being and it cannot verify my-being-in-the-world. Not only do I exist in the world, but I do not need the look of the other to grasp the objectivity of myself—there is no need to be watched by the other in order for me to realize myself. I am in the world and finitude makes me realize my authentic being as a different part of the “they”, which constitutes me and my given world. Through the act of finitude, I capture my-being that which already has surpassed me in the future of the now. The truism is that, it is not my “look” which I emerge or manifest and illuminate my encountering in the world. It is my-Dasein or my being-in-the-world and within-it-alongside-among-others, that which is sufficient for my existence. My co-presence does not have to be tangible or physical in a particular place and look, because my presence is guaranteed in its spatial and proximal sphere. I am in the world. I do not have to be seen by the other to constitute my existence. My being is the axiom of there-I-am.

Sartre and Heidegger intermingle, and at the same time diverge from one another. In this essay I have encompassed their philosophical discourse in an existential-ontological level, concerning the conditions of human existence and being. Sartre emphasizes the temporal look of the other as that which is important for my being, because through the look of the other I realize myself and become aware of my-being—anguish makes me to act and to be the one that is not yet realized as a possible possibility. Action is of a great significance for Sartre because, it opens up and it creates my freedom. On the other hand, the advantage and superiority of Heidegger’s axiom regarding my freedom, is that of my *finitude*. My being is in a constant concern and solicitude—I am not *remote* from the other because I am with-the-other—I do *constitute* the other *being-with* the “them’ as part of the “they” [man]. In this regard Heidegger was right; his idea of the “they” and “being-in-the-world” in the mode of “being-with-alongside” the others *constituting* them and vice-versa, trumps over Sartre’s “look” and the notion of “action”. To be with others in the proximity of a spatial environment is a given because, we naturally or unconsciously act and interact with others regardless of the look. To *encounter* by being-alone in the world as Sartre believes, it is to be on the surface of the human existence and not a part of it. I am not alone because I am a part of the others as being the “they”. Not only

do we need to constitute the other and be constituted by the other, but we organically and naturally are as such. Thus is Heidegger's apprehension of being: we exist in the finitude of the naturalistic spectrum of "human-worldly-time". Therefore, apprehending the truism and not the nihilism of finitude; this is the only humanly path to be in the world, as it is, and as we humanly know it. I emanate from the "they" to be "me" towards my finitude, but not the finitude of the "they". The "they" is the evanescence of life and "I" am a part of it. The "they" transcends my being in the world.

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